

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 240692

62

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY OES;MBKRATZER:FEJ

APPROVED BY OES:MBKRATZER

EA - MR. HABIB (IN DRAFT)

PM - MR. VEST (IN DRAFT)

D - MR. PENDLETON (IN DRAFT)

C - MR. KELLY (IN DRAFT)

S/P: MR. KALICKI (DRAFT)

ACDA - MR. DAVIES (IN DRAFT)

S/S: MR. HOGANSON

----- 041439

O P 090155Z OCT 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 240692

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: TECH, ENRG, KS

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL'S MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR HAHM OF KOREA

1. DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL CALLED IN AMBASSADOR HAHM ON
OCTOBER 7 TO REINFORCE THE U.S. EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE ROK
TO FOREGO ITS PLANS TO ACQUIRE FRENCH-BUILT REPROCESSING
FACILITY. HAHM WAS ACCOMPANIED BY POL COUNSELOR YOO.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB, VEST (PM) AND KRATZER (OES)
ALSO PARTICIPATED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 240692

2. DEPUTY SECRETARY STATED WE WISH TO ENSURE THAT ROK IS

FULLY AWARE OF SERIOUSNESS WE ATTACH TO REPROCESSING ISSUE BEFORE FINAL RESPONSE IS MADE TO AMBASSADOR SNEIDER'S DEMARCHE. POINTING TO DESTABILIZING EFFECT ON THE REGION OF KOREAN ACQUISITION OF REPROCESSING CAPABILITY, HE STRESSED THAT SUCH ACQUISITION WOULD SPARK HIGHLY CRITICAL CONGRESSIONAL REACTION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE OUR FUTURE NUCLEAR COOPERATION, INCLUDING LOAN ASSISTANCE TO KOREAN PLANTS. HE SUGGESTED KOREA PURSUE ITS REPROCESSING AMBITION IN MULTINATIONAL FRAMEWORK, WHICH WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO ENCOURAGE. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD NOT OBJECT TO CANCELLATION IF APPROPRIATE TERMINATION CHARGES ARE PAID.

3. OBVIOUSLY RESPONDING ON BASIS OF CAREFULLY PREPARED REBUTTAL, HAHM REPEATED FAMILIAR KOREAN ARGUMENT THAT ROK HAD FIRST APPROACHED U.S. FOR REPROCESSING ASSISTANCE WITHOUT RESPONSE, THAT PROPOSED FACILITY HAS NO PRODUCTION CAPABILITY BUT IS FOR PURPOSE OF TRAINING AND ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY WHICH WILL ENABLE KOREA TO EVALUATE ECONOMIES ON INFORMED BASIS AND PARTICIPATE MEANINGFULLY IN FUTURE MULTINATIONAL FACILITY, AND THAT, WITHOUT URANIUM OF ITS OWN, KOREA MUST LOOK FORWARD TO REPROCESSING TO ENSURE NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLIES AND TO AVOID COSTLY TRANSPORT, STORAGE, ETC. CONFIRMING THAT KOREA WAS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN REGIONAL REPROCESSING ENTERPRISE WHEN ONE IS FORMED, HE INQUIRED WHETHER U.S., RATHER THAN INSISTING ON CANCELLATION, WOULD BE WILLING TO OBTAIN ALL NECESSARY ASSURANCES BY DIRECT APPLICATION OF SUPPLEMENTARY SAFEGUARD MEASURES.

4. DEPT. OFFICIALS COUNTERED HAHM'S ARGUMENTS, POINTING OUT THAT REPROCESSING IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO OPERATION OF LIGHT WATER REACTOR FUEL CYCLE, AND THAT ITS ECONOMICS ARE EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL AND, IN ANY CASE, ARE SUBJECT TO ECONOMIES OF SCALE WHICH MAKE REPROCESSING FOR KOREA'S LIMITED NUCLEAR PROGRAM ESPECIALLY UNFAVORABLE. THEY ALSO EXPLAINED THAT REPROCESSING HAS LITTLE RELEVANCE TO ASSURANCE OF NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY SINCE, IN ANY EVENT, IT COULD REDUCE NUCLEAR FUEL AND ENRICHMENT REQUIREMENTS BY ONLY ABOUT 20 PERCENT. THUS, KOREA WILL HAVE TO DEPEND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 240692

ON OUTSIDE NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY IN ANY CASE. THEY TOOK ISSUE WITH HAHM'S ASSERTION THAT FACILITY WAS TOO SMALL FOR WEAPONS PRODUCTION BY CITING UNDISPUTED FACT THAT IT HAS CAPACITY FOR ABOUT 20 KG/YR. PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION IF OPERATED ON YEAR ROUND BASIS. THEY CONCLUDED BY STRESSING THAT VERY FACT THAT FACILITY WAS NOT RELATED TO CLEAR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT OR ECONOMIC NEED WOULD LEAD TO UNFORTUNATE PERCEPTION BY OTHERS, INCLUDING U.S. CONGRESS,

THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO COUNTER EFFECTIVELY. IN RESPONSE TO HAHM'S SUGGESTION THAT U.S. APPLY SUPPLEMENTARY SAFEGUARDS, DEPT. OFFICIALS STATED THAT ISSUE IS PHYSICAL EXISTENCE OF REPROCESSING CAPABILITY IN KOREA, AND THAT, IN PERCEPTION OF OTHERS, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS COULD NOT BE OVERCOME BY ANY CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS.

5. IN LENGTHY DISCUSSION HAHM CAME UP WITH NEW TWIST, SUGGESTING THAT, AS ALTERNATIVE TO CANCELLATION, FACILITY BE BROUGHT FROM THE OUTSET WITHIN MULTINATIONAL FRAMEWORK WHICH U.S. ADVOCATES. DEPT. OFFICIALS RESPONDED THAT FIRST STEP IN EXPLORATION OF MULTINATIONAL APPROACH INVOLVES ENGINEERING AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

BY COUNTRIES OF REGION, AND THAT, AS SMALL RESEARCH FACILITY, PROPOSED PLANT HAD NO CAPABILITY OF GENERATING INFORMATION OF USE TO SUCH STUDY. THEY ALSO STRESSED THAT STUDY OF MULTINATIONAL APPROACH SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT PRIOR JUDGMENT AS TO PLANT LOCATION, AND THAT INCLUSION OF EVEN SMALL KOREAN FACILITY IN MULTINATIONAL FRAMEWORK WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH NEED TO AVOID PREJUDGING ISSUE OF LOCATION. IN RESPONSE TO HAHM'S CONTENTION THAT CANCELLATION WOULD DEPRIVE ROK OF ESSENTIAL TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES, DEPT. OFFICIALS INDICATED U.S. WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER COOPERATING IN PROVIDING TRAINING IN U.S. FACILITIES AFTER REPEAT AFTER SUITABLE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IS WELL ON ITS WAY.

6. ANOTHER THEME TO WHICH HAHM RETURNED REPEATEDLY WAS ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN KOREA, WHOSE REPROCESSING PROGRAM WE WISH TO CANCEL, AND JAPAN, WHICH HAS PROCEEDED WITHOUT U.S. COMPLAINT WITH MUCH LARGER FRENCH-BUILT FACILITY. STATING THAT TECHNOLOGICAL APTITUDE AND WILL-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 240692

INGNESS TO WORK WERE ONLY ASSETS KOREA POSSESSES, HAHM COMPLAINED REPEATEDLY THAT U.S. ACTION WOULD HELP PERPETUATE ECONOMIC GAP BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA, WHICH THEY ARE DETERMINED TO OVERCOME, AND WOULD IN FACT MAKE KOREA DEPENDENT ON JAPAN. IN RESPONSE, DEPT. OFFICIALS CITED DIFFERENCES IN STRATEGIC SITUATION OF KOREAN PENINSULA AND JAPAN, ONCE AGAIN STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS AS TO POSSIBLE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF KOREAN REPROCESSING FACILITY, NOTWITHSTANDING ITS DECLARED PURPOSE. FYI EMBASSY MAY WISH TO EMPHASIZE THIS ASPECT IN EVENT ROKG PURSUES THIS LINE OF ARGUMENTATION. END FYI. THEY ALSO POINTED OUT THAT JAPANESE DECISION TO BUILD REPROCESSING FACILITY NOW NEARING COMPLETION WAS MADE SOME 8 YEARS AGO WHEN WORLD-WIDE PERCEPTION OF NEED FOR AND ECONOMIC DESIRABILITY OF REPROCESSING WERE MUCH

MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN AT PRESENT. MOREOVER, FOR LARGER NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM, JAPAN WILL HAVE NEED FOR REPROCESSING MUCH EARLIER THAN KOREA. DEPT. OFFICIALS ALSO QUESTIONED HOW ENGAGING IN UNECONOMIC OPERATION, SUCH AS SMALL-SCALE REPROCESSING, COULD HELP CLOSE ECONOMIC GAP BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN. HAHM REPEATEDLY COMMENTED THAT IT LOOKED AS IF KOREA WAS BEING ASKED TO GIVE UP SOMETHING WHICH JAPAN WAS ALLOWED TO HAVE, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY FOR ROKG TO CANCEL IF U.S. INSISTED ON CANCELLATION OF PLANT. FYI HAHM DID NOT APPEAR TO MAKE THIS OBSERVATION ON INSTRUCTIONS. END FYI.

7. NEAR THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ONCE AGAIN POINTED OUT TO HAHM THAT A KOREAN DECISION TO PROCEED WOULD FACE KOREA WITH A POLITICAL PROBLEM IN THE

U.S. HAHM ASKED WHY THE STATE DEPARTMENT COULD NOT CONVINCE THE HILL OF THE BENIGN NATURE OF KOREAN PLANS, AND WAS REMINDED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DO SO GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE INSTALLATION COULD PRODUCE WEAPONS-GRADE PLUTONIUM. INSPECTION WOULD NOT SUFFICE TO OVERCOME RESISTANCE. HAHM COMMENTED THAT THE ARGUMENT ABOUT THE POSSIBLE PRODUCTION OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIAL IS "DEVASTATING" BUT RETURNED TO HIS COMPARISON WITH THE JAPAN CASE. HE NOTED AT ONE POINT DURING THE CONVERSATION THAT IF WE SAY KOREA HAS TO CANCEL, HE SUPPOSES IT WILL HAVE TO. (FYI, SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 240692

WE BELIEVE THIS OBSERVATION WAS MADE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION AND WE WOULD NOT WANT IT REPEATED TO ROK OFFICIALS.)

8. IN BRIEF DISCUSSION FOLLOWING CONCLUSION OF MEETING, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB SUGGESTED TO HAHM THAT TIME HAD COME FOR HAHM, WHO, UNLIKE ROK NUCLEAR OFFICIALS, WAS NOT PERSONALLY ASSOCIATED WITH REPROCESSING FACILITY PLANS, TO MAKE FORTHRIGHT RECOMMENDATION TO PRESIDENT, WHO ALSO HAS REMAINED PERSONALLY DISENGAGED, TO DECIDE IN FAVOR OF CANCELLATION. KISSINGER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION, MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 OCT 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: SmithRJ
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE240692
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: FEJ
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750350-0442
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751069/aaaacjve.tel
Line Count: 211
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: SmithRJ
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 OCT 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: WITHDRAWN <04 APR 2003 by SmithRJ, RDFRD, REFER TO DOE>; RELEASED <02 OCT 2003 by SmithRJ>; APPROVED <02 OCT 2003 by SmithRJ>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HAHM OF KOREA
TAGS: TECH, ENRG, KS, US, (INGERSOLL, ROBERT S), (HAHM)
To: SEOUL
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006